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PRODUCTION

5-8

24 MAY 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support Required of ORR for
Special Arab/Israeli Task Force

PRESENT: Messrs. Morell, [REDACTED] (part of
meeting), [REDACTED]

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1. Mr. Morell opened the meeting by observing the requirements to be established by the newly created Task Force would largely determine the kind of support which ORR will provide.

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2. He expected, however, that shipping will be high on the list. [REDACTED] has checked and found that little information is available on ship movements in this area. It was agreed that there is a collection problem on this subject.

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3. [REDACTED] said he had not had time to compile a list of research requirements but one question is how long can Israel survive a blockade. [REDACTED] reported Israel's oil requirements as 10,000 t/day or one tanker per day. Haifa has about 60 days storage capacity. It is not known how full the Haifa tanks are at present, but it would be normal for them to be more than half full and less than completely filled. It is understood that Israeli flag ships rarely transit the Straits of Tiran but [REDACTED] believes that Israeli owned vessels engaged in this trade are generally under foreign registry. Oil could be shipped from Nigeria or Venezuela through the Mediterranean to circumvent the blockade, but some of the Nigerian operators may be dependent on Suez for the movement of their Middle East oil. [REDACTED] is checking to see if he can identify any Nigerian operators not dependent on transit to Suez.


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4. Mr. Morell suggested that the discussion be focussed on what we can profitably do to support the Task Force. For example, are detailed ship movements required? [REDACTED] thought they will be but agreed

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that collection is a problem. [REDACTED] inquired whether there are any U-2's in the area, to which 25X1A

25X1A [REDACTED] replied, not any more. [REDACTED] noted that the US Sixth Fleet could readily overfly the region and in reply to [REDACTED] question as 25X1A

25X1C [REDACTED]

25X1C [REDACTED] ACTION: Since T/TR is fully occupied with Vietnam matters, T/IS, under [REDACTED] will take primary responsibility for support on supply problems and will coordinate soonest on requirements for collection 25X1A

25X1A against ship movements. [REDACTED] OCI, will act as executive officer on the Task Force to free [REDACTED] for outside activities, and [REDACTED] will assist 25X1A

25X1A [REDACTED] The Task Force will want a 24 hour point of contact with ORR. [REDACTED] will agree with 25X1A

25X1A [REDACTED] who this person should be. NOTE: It has been agreed that for the present, ORR support will be provided primarily by CSS, assisted by T/IS. 25X1A

25X1A 5. [REDACTED] asked if the special Task Force needed background support on Haifa and other locations. 25X1A

25X1A [REDACTED] thought such support was not needed immediately but would be useful for background.

25X1A 6. [REDACTED] asked whether anyone is looking at the effect of the denial of Suez. [REDACTED] did not believe anyone had yet had time to do this. 25X1A

25X1A 7. [REDACTED] inquired whether there were any signs that Israel would act at once or wait before reacting, to which [REDACTED] replied that he thought the Israelis would wait only long enough to see what we and the British do about our guarantee of access to Eilat. [REDACTED] ventured that within a few days the Israelis would take action which would change the nature of the question. If they wait it would be for tactical reasons but he estimates they will fight. 25X1A

25X1A 8. Mr. Morell wanted to know how useful an inventory of weapons available would be, to which 25X1A

25X1A [REDACTED] indicated that the Pentagon and DIA cover this subject solidly and in a responsive manner.

25X1A 9. [REDACTED] asked about the extent of UAR mobilization. [REDACTED] believed they had raised their normal Sinai force from 30-35,000 to about 50,000 and reduced their troops in Yemen from about 35,000 down to 30,000. 25X1A

10. Leading off in a survey of ad hoc estimates of types of support which might be required, [REDACTED] listed the vulnerability of Israel to a blockade and the effect of the obstruction or selective interdiction of Suez by the UAR.

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25X1A 11. [REDACTED] thought the consequences of mobilization on the UAR economy might be worth studying. The UAR had recently taken measures to lighten the defense load. What would be the economic effect of mobilization and of active military operations? ACTION: Mr. Morell thought this would make a good paper for ERA to put on the back burner.

25X1A 12. [REDACTED] agreed that the foregoing were good possibilities but thought on the whole that the overall situation could not appropriately be characterized as an economic problem. He did not view the scenario as leading us into a long period of tension. Israel would soon act and resolve the current uncertainty. He agreed that ship movements are largely a collection problem and he thought we should check with [REDACTED] for support on this subject.

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25X1A 13. Mr. Morell asked what kind of support would be needed from ORR in an Israeli-Arab war, to which [REDACTED] replied that he expected the war to be short and not require as much economic intelligence as a lot of battle intelligence. Assuming the Arabs stick together, he thought that Israel would have to take on the UAR, Syria, and Jordan, but not Saudi Arabia. He thought the chances were good that the Israelis would dispose of the Arabs in a few days.

25X1A 14. [REDACTED] agreed that there did not seem to be a great need for economic research at the present time.

25X1A 15. [REDACTED] thought that a look at what economic leverage the US and Britain could apply against the Arabs would be worthwhile.

16. Mr. Morell suggested that some thought be given to what game the French are playing.

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25X1A 17. In response to a question from [REDACTED] on what makes Nasser tick, [REDACTED] thought it is mostly frustration. Nasser is convinced that the US is out to get him. We may have to invite the Soviets to participate at the mid-Eastern table.

18. Mr. Morell asked what has been done about photographic collection, to which [REDACTED] replied that there has been too little time to do much. An [REDACTED]

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25X1A 19. In reply to [REDACTED] question as to whether Nasser could politically survive a military misadventure, 25X1A [REDACTED] explained that Nasser might be able to survive if he could make it appear to his people that the great powers had conspired against him.

20. Following the departure of [REDACTED] required courses of action were summarized by Mr. Morell as follows:

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a. We should investigate the possible effects of an Egyptian effort to blockade Israel.

b. What can ORR do to monitor such a blockade?

c. In the event of war what kind of intelligence reporting will be required of ORR? Mr. Morell doubted that we will be involved as heavily as we are in supporting the Vietnam operations. He thought that more support will be required from ERA than from MRA.

25X1A d. What counter-leverage can be exerted on the UAR by the US, Britain, and others? [REDACTED] doubted that the US can apply much economic leverage against the UAR and wondered if any leverage could be applied against Syria. He suspected strongly that the UAR has assurances of Soviet support.)

e. How can the US counteract Soviet arms shipments to the UAR?

f. Is there any prospect of the Arabs making a Holy War out of the conflict? [REDACTED] thought that the last national estimate held that Israel could knock out the Arabs.)

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g. Will Iran support the UAR? [REDACTED] thought it very doubtful. The Shah is anti-Nasser and anti-Arab.)

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h. What is the extent of Israeli dependence on foreign trade?

i. Will the blockade of Eilat eventually be circumvented by a gimmick to save face for Nasser, such as the use of non-Israeli ships? What if US or British armed vessels escort ships into the Gulf of Aqaba? [REDACTED] noted that international law on closed bodies of water was not very clear.)

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21. [REDACTED] reminded that perhaps [REDACTED] should be readied [REDACTED]

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Executive Assistant
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EA/RR [REDACTED] (24 May 67)

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